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THE SPEAKER APPOINTS CREDIT RATING AGENCY WORKING GROUP 
In late January 2002, the Honorable Thomas M. Finneran, Speaker of the House 
of Representatives, formed an ad hoc select committee of the Massachusetts House of 
Representatives known as the Credit Rating Working Group. This select committee or 
working group consisted of the House Committee on Post Audit and Oversight (HPAO), 
House Committee on Transportation, and House Committee on Long Term Debt. 
Throughout February 2002, this Credit Rating Working Group met with the three major 
credit rating agencies, as well as with the Office of the Treasurer and Receiver General 
and the Office of the Comptroller. All meetings were held in the HP AO Committee 
Chairman's office in Room 146. Following the series of seminars and presentations by 
analysts and selected state executives involved in the debt of the Commonwealth of 
Massachusetts, the Credit Rating Working Group held a public hearing on Tuesday, 5 
March 2002 in Gardner Auditorium. The hearing took testimony from persons and 
representatives of: credit rating agencies, constitutional offices, independent authorities 
and agencies, and the Executive regarding the credit of the Commonwealth of 
Massachusetts. An agenda for the public hearings is attached. The volume of testimony 
made a second hearing necessary, which was held on Wednesday, 20 March 2002. 
This report discusses recommendations and topics that were developed from 
dialogue between legislators, legislative and House committee staff, staff of the HP AO 
Bureau, credit rating agency managers and state debt managers. This dialogue took place 
at both the private meetings ofthe select committee and at the public hearings held at the 
Gardner Auditorium on Tuesday, 5 March 2002, and in Room B-1, both hearing rooms at 
the Massachusetts State House. 1 
Members of the Select Committee forming the Credit Rating Working Group are: 
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MEMBERS OF THE CREDIT RATING WORKING GROUP SELECT COM1\UTTEE 
HOUSE COMMITTEE ON POST AUDIT AND OVERSIGHT 
Rep. James H. Fagan of Taunton, chairman 
Rep. James E. Vallee of Franklln, vice chairman 
Rep. Frank M. Hynes of Marshfield 
Rep. Louis L. Kafka of Sharon 
Rep. Geraldine Creedon of Brockton 
Rep. Stephen P. LeDuc of Marlborough 
Rep. Mark V. Falzone of Saugus 
Rep. Thomas M. Stanley of Waltham 
Rep. James M. Murphy ofWeynlOuth 
Rep. Robert S.Hargraves of Groton 
Rep. John A. Locke of Wellesley 
HOUSE COMMITTEE ON LONG TERM DEBT AND CAPITAL EXPENDITURES 
Rep.Marie J. Parente of Milford, chairwoman 
Rep. Frank M. Hynes of Marshfield, vice chainnan 
Rep. David L. Flynn of Bridgewater 
Rep. J. James Marzilli Jr. of Arlington 
Rep. Jay R. Kaufman of Lexington 
Rep. Brian Knuuttila of Gardner 
Rep. Cheryl A. Rivera of Springfield 
Rep. Thomas M. Stanley of Waltham 
Rep. James M . Murphy of Weymouth 
Rep. Cele Hahn of Westfield 
Rep. Robert S. Hargraves of Groton 
HOUSE COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION 
Rep. Joseph C. Sullivan of Braintree, chaimlan 
Rep. \rVil1iam M. Straus of Mattapoisett, vice chairman 
Rep. Paul E. Caron of Springfield 
Rep. Eric Turkington of Falmouth 
Rep. Stephen Kulik of Worthington 
Rep. Anne M. Paulsen of Belmont 
Rep. Palll C. Demakis of Boston 
Rep. Brian Knuuttila of Gardner 
Rep. Elizabeth A. Malia of Boston 
Rep. Anthony Petruccelli of Boston 
Rep. Elizabeth A. Poirier of North Attleborough 
Rep. Viriato M. deMacedo of Plymouth 
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Recommendations 
1. Develop a plan that restores structural balance to the state budget. 
(Pages 12-13). 
2. Avoid whenever possible one-time "quick-fix" solutions and/or 
gimmicks. (Pages 13-15). 
3. Utilize a portion of the tobacco settlement proceeds to leverage 
federal matching monies to Medicaid and future health costs and/or to 
continue some level of funding for both the stabilization fund and the 
pension fund in a time of depleted state revenue. (Pages 15-17). 
4. Use utmost caution on increased state borrowing. (Page 9). 
5. Avoid the issuance of "Tobacco Bonds" as a means to address the 
structural budget deficit. (Page 1 7). 
6. Make any ongoing use of the stabilization fund subject to a two-thirds 
vote of the Legislature and require that the funds accessed be 
appropriated back to the stabilization fund over a four year period. 
(Page 18). 
7. Require contribution to stabilization fund in all years with amendment 
to Chapter 29. Set appropriations at no more than 98 percent of the 
official revenue forecast and appropriate the remainder of said monies 
to the stabilization fund. (Page 18). 
8. Establish a "Debt Avoidance Fund" that will be financed by revenues 
from capital gains, bonuses and stock options that exceed the 
historical average for those components of income tax revenue as 
established by the Legislature and the Department of Revenue. 
(Pages 18; 32). 
9. No reduction in the Pension Fund's budget appropriation should occur 
without a comprehensive plan that achieves structural balance and 
addresses pension fund stability over the short and long terms. (Pages 
19; 21-23). 
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10. A revised Pension Fund valuation, and an analysis of any proposal to 
alter the current pension-funding schedule, must be an essential part 
of any plan to restore structural balance to the Massachusetts budget. 
(Pages 19-23). 
11. Avoid the issuance of any "fiscal recovery bonds" or the use of deficit 
financing. (Pages 14; 20; 23-24). 
12. Require MassPort to reimburse the Commonwealth for the additional 
financing cost imposed as a result of the delay of its $105 million 
December 2002 CAiT payment. (Pages 25-27). 
13. Require MassPort to advise and inform the Legislature in a timely 
fashion of any and all issues materially impacting the financial 
stability of the Authority. (Pages 26-27). 
14. Review and determine the governing structure, autonomy and 
relationship to the Executive that should be imposed upon the 
Massachusetts Turnpike Authority and other agencies and authorities 
of the Commonwealth. (Pages 28-29). 
15. Create a select task force on the School Building Assistance program 
to review the report and recommendations of the Executive Office of 
Administration and Finance on "Reconstructing the School Building 
Assistance Program," and to issue findings on the feasibility of a 
capital pooling for school building projects. (Pages 29-31). 
16. Create a Legislative Fiscal Bureau similar to legislative budget offices 
in other states such as Wisconsin's Fiscal Bureau or on the national 
level, the Congressional Budget Office. The Bureau will be a non-
partisan entity that will assist the House and Senate Committee on 
Ways & Means with certain functions which shall include (1) 
estimating state revenues; (2) analyzing and evaluating costlbenefit of 
state programs; (3) monitoring state agencies' budgets and programs; 
and, (4) evaluating legislative proposals for fiscal effect. (Pages 32-
33). 
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17. The House & Senate Committees on Ways & Means, the Executive 
Office of Administration and Finance, and the Department of Revenue 
should jointly conduct a study that will recommend methods or 
systems that will allow the Department of Revenue and the 
Legislative Fiscal Bureau to segment and project components of the 
income tax revenue stream among capital gains, bonuses and stock 
options. In addition, the above study will also recommend methods or 
systems that will allow tax revenue estimates to be less reliant on 
national economic trends and be more clearly focused on state 
economic-sector analysis. (Pages 32-33). 
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TOPICS 
1. . CREDIT RATINGS 
Definitions and Standards 
Credit ratings are simply an opinion regarding an entity's ability to repay its debt. 
It is not a recommendation to buy, sell, or hold on to a security. Ratings are seals of 
approval for state's creditworthiness by objective analysts. 2 Moody's Investors Service 
defines a credit rating as "an independent, objective opinion about credit risk ... Judgment 
of the investment quality of a long-term obligation issued by a state or one of its 
subdivisions ... Assessment ofthe ability and willingness of an issuer to make full and 
timely payments of amounts due on the security over its life.,,3 An outlook, in contrast, is 
to provide investors with a sense of where an entity may be going beyond its rating over a 
medium-term horizon of 12-18 months. A "Negative Outlook could indicate credit has 
undergone stress, but [the entity] is in the process of implementing a strategic plan 
that has a reasonable chance of restoring stability.'>'! (Emphasis added.) 
A rating is "typically assigned to a specific series of bonds or debt instrument, not 
the state." For example, Moody's refers to its assigned ratings in this way: "we have 
affirmed our Aa2 rating on the Commonwealth's outstanding general obligation bonds 
which means that all of the general obligation bonds carry the Aa2 rating.',5 The three 
primary rating agencies - Fitch Ratings, Moody's Investors Service, and Standard & 
Poor's - each use a specific set of rating factors in determining credit ratings. Common 
factors include (1) the current and historical economic situation, (2) management factors, 
(3) the level of indebtedness, and (4) financial strengths and weaknesses. 
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Massachusetts' Strengths and Weaknesses 
The Commonwealth' s major strengths in the eyes of the credit rating agencies 
include: the sizeable (at present) stabilization fund; the thus-far conservative approach to 
spending tobacco settlement funds; constrained spending on recurring expenses during 
the most recent economic boom; capital projects funded, in part, with cash, and the 
"accelerated schedule for [the elimination of] un-funded pension liability.,,6 
The Commonwealth's major weaknesses in the eyes ofthe credit rating agencies 
include: one of the heaviest tax-supported debt burdens in the country whether measured 
as a percent of personal income or as a per-capita debt burden; as well as the cost of the 
ongoing Central Artery/Tunnel (CNT) Project together with uncertainty as to how any 
further CNT cost overruns would be funded. Fitch Ratings also pointed to the lack of a 
consensus revenue forecast for FY2002 as a weakness, and questioned as well the 
Commonwealth' s ability to absorb the lowering of the personal income tax rate.? 
Massachusetts' current state debt to personal income ratio is high at "about 9 
percent" while New York State debt to personal income ratio is "about 6 percent," the 
analyst for Fitch Ratings advised. Generally, states with decentralized governments 
(unlike Massachusetts) maintain personal income to state debt ratios of approximately 3 
percent of personal income. The Credit Rating Working Group was cautioned that a 
personal income debt ratio higher than 10 percent would cause the debt service payments 
to erode and impair the operating budget of the Commonwealth. Moody's also pointed 
out that while Massachusetts has a capital cap, this is not a "meaningful constraint," 
because the Commonwealth has a long history of issuing debt outside of the cap.8 
Massachusetts 'Ratings 
Moody's currently rates Massachusetts General Obligation bonds at Aa2 with a 
negative outlook, classifying this as an average rating. Thirteen other states share that 
rating, while nineteen fall in the higher categories of Aaa or Aa1.9 Fitch Ratings rates 
Massachusetts General Obligation bonds at AA-, which they classified as a good rating 
but indicated that most states have a higher rating. Standard & Poor's currently rates 
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Massachusetts General Obligation bonds at AA-, and noted that 45-46 states are in the 
AA range or higher. 
The rating agencies all emphasized that they do not encourage ratings as a reason 
to take a particular action or not to take a particular action in government; rather, actions 
should be based on what is appropriate for the state or municipality. While rating 
agencies do not comment or recommend particular policies, they all advocated for the 
broad goal of a structurally balanced budget. 
State by State Comparison 
As a service to its clients, Standard and Poor's released their State of the States 
report on March 5, 2002. This release date was coincident with the House select 
committee on Credit Rating's public hearing at the State House. The last Standard and 
Poor's State of the States report was released in October of 200 1. Since the October 
report, the states have seen even weaker revenues than were previously estimated. Four 
states (New Jersey, Tennessee, Wisconsin, and Colorado) are now on Credit Watch with 
Negative Implications; three others (California, Indiana, and Kentucky) now have 
negative outlooks; and two states' outlooks (Massachusetts and Illinois) went from 
positive to stable.1o 
The State of the States report asserts that conservative revenue forecasting and 
formalized reserve policies are helping some states. Other states are reducing their 
spending and workforce with the primary tool being spending reductions. Some states 
have opted to roll back tax reductions, have implemented targeted fee increases or other 
minor tax or revenue measures, broadened the tax base supporting a specific tax, and/or 
have raised the tobacco tax, according to the report. Florida delayed its intangible tax 
reduction until 2004 and Maryland is considering deferring the personal income tax 
reductions. Some states also have mechanisms in their constitutions for automatic 
solutions if reserves/ revenues fall below a certain level, according to the Standard and 
Poor's report. 
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Investor Perception 
States themselves are not the primary "users" of a credit rating; rather, investors 
are a credit rating agency's principal audience. Investor perception of a state's fiscal 
health is determined in large part by a state's credit ratings. Thus, a good credit rating 
attracts quality investors. Good credit ratings also translate into favorable interest rates 
for a state's borrowing. In addition to investors, other important and regular users of 
public finance credit ratings are the communications media. In conjunction with the 
rating agency comments, media comments influence investor perceptions and consequent 
actions. That is, the more favorable are the reports of credit rating agencies and the 
communication of those favorable reports, the more investors tend to buy the solidly 
rated public finance securities of a state or municipality. 
Ratings also matter if investors panic and a condition known as "flight to quality" 
occurs, Fitch Ratings said during the Credit Rating Public Hearing. Bond buyers tend to 
be conservative investors searching for stability and prudence in public financial 
management, the credit rating panel generally agreed. I I 
2. CREDIT RATINGS AND INTEREST RATES ON STATE BORROWING 
Legislators were particularly interested in the relationship between a state's credit 
rating and the rate of interest assigned to an issue. At both the private seminars with 
credit rating agencies and at the public hearing on 5 March, House Members asked about 
that relationship. At the public hearing the credit rating agencies stated that credit ratings 
are not the sole factor in determining interest rates for a state's debt, but they are 
important. 12 Ratings, like it or not, are a seal of approval. 13 
Current interest rates are very low and that has helped Massachusetts "refund" a 
large part of its more expensive older debt. "Credit spreads" are low between various 
public debt issuers because interest rates are extremely low, the Deputy Treasurer for 
Debt Management recently advised members of the Credit Rating Working Group. 14 At 
the same time, the State Treasurer and the rating agencies concurred that if Massachusetts 
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acts with alacrity and prudence to close the structural gap between reduced revenue and 
its current unsustainable expenses with a thoughtful plan, "we will make our debt 
offering more attractive to both credit rating agencies and that therefore makes 
[Massachusetts] more attractive to investors.,,15 
Standard & Poor's indicated that bond prices depend on the market, interest rates, 
etc., but that generally speaking, if a bond rating decreases, the costs to the state 
increase. 16 According to the Deputy Treasurer for Debt Management, for example, a 
reduction of a AA rating to an A will usually result in an increase of 25 basis points (each 
basis point is 11100 of 1 percent). This could increase the cost of financing the 
Commonwealth's capital plan by $40 to $45 million. Likewise, a reduction to BBB from 
A could add approximately $120 million to finance costS.1 7 
As noted by a Massachusetts-based bond fund: The credit quality of municipal 
issuers overall held relatively steady during 2001, with credit upgrades exceeding 
downgrades throughout the year. That said, there were some signs of deterioration during 
the final months of the year. That's when Moody's Investors Service downgraded the 
credit outlook, but not the credit rating of more than a dozen states. While most states 
were confronted with the twin challenges of sharply declining revenues and rising 
expenditures, those that were dependent on tourism, the technology industry and 
manufacturing were particularly hard hit by the economic slump and the events of 
September 11 . In a related development, municipal bonds backed by airports and airlines 
also experienced credit trends due to the decline in travel after the terrorist attacks. 18 
3. RATING FUNDAMENTALS 
Long-term Planning Creates Stability 
All of the credit rating agencies told the select House Committee on Credit Rating 
that they look for a realistic long-term plan to achieve stability.19 The credit rating 
agencies stressed that they do not take a position on specific policy decisions; however, 
they equally stressed the importance of having any and all policy decisions regarding 
revenue and expenditures made in the context of a comprehensive plan. A plan includes 
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a move toward a "structurally balanced budget," a term used by all three rating agencies 
and defined by Moody's as a budget in which recurring revenues equal recurring 
expendi tures. 20 
While one-time revenue sources ... are all deemed feasible 
options ... the credit rating agencies stressed that any such one-time 
infusions must be incorporated into a broader plan to bring the budget 
back into structural balance. 
If fiscal goals are not immediately attainable, the rating agencies wish to see a 
longer-term strategy to reach those goals. While one-time revenue sources such as 
infusions from the stabilization fund, borrowing against tobacco settlement funds, and 
postponement of the accelerated state pension funding schedule payments are all deemed 
feasible options to close the budget gap, the credit rating agencies stressed that any such 
one-time infusions must be incorporated into a broader plan to bring the budget back into 
structural balance. Credit rating agencies view it as problematic when states find 
themselves continually searching for one-time stop-gaps to fund ongoing spending levels 
that outstrip recurring revenues. 
Credit Ratings: Beware of Gimmicks and Quick Fixes 
All of the rating agencies stressed long-term thoughtful solutions to structural 
budget problems and warned legislators to beware of gimmicks when attempting to 
restore structural balance - matching recurring revenues with recurring expenses. 
Moody's Investors Service advised that the rating agency "is interested in seeing a plan to 
achieve long term stability" and that Moody's "wants to see solutions that stay away from 
a one time fiX."21 Similarly, the deputy treasurer for debt management in the Office of 
the Treasurer and Receiver General specifically warned that any "fanciful schemes" to 
temporarily "plug the holes in a structural budget balance" would hurt Massachusetts in 
the view of credit rating analysts. 
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Although not specifically mentioned as gimmicks, all of the rating agencies 
cautioned against viewing a "securitization" or creation of so-called "tobacco bonds" as 
an easy means to obtain quick cash. Often the "quick cash" was necessary to plug gaping 
holes in other states' operating budgets. The "tobacco bonds" are "securitized" from 
monies obtained by the 1998 Tobacco Settlement (a negotiated deal between 46 states 
and some municipalities and large tobacco product companies).22 (See Section on 
Tobacco Bonds below.) 
Credit rating agencies do not make "policy" statements. Rather, the actions of a 
public entity (Massachusetts, for example) are evaluated by the agency which then offers 
its opinion and analysis to investors regarding a public entity's creditworthiness. Thus, 
the credit raters offer only an analysis ofthe utilization of tobacco bonds. 
Moody's Investor Service has altered its view oftobacco bonds: 
In prior years tobacco bonds were used by several states as a 
way of shifting the risk to investors, with the risk being 
variability in those future payments (largely due to 
consumption patterns). The proceeds were then used to create 
an endowment or to fund various special programs. This year 
several states have proposed using tobacco bonds as a cash 
infusion to fill a budget gap. Used in this way, we view these 
types of bonds as a form of deficit financing. Using bonds for 
this purpose limits a state's future financial flexibility. This is 
because the bond proceeds are used upfront, and future 
payments are restricted for debt service on those bonds. In 
many cases, states have limited, practical alternatives for filling 
their budget gap, and in such cases, we think tobacco bonds 
can be part of a reasonable solution, if they are part of a 
strategy to restore structural balance to the budget. 23 
Fitch Ratings does not consider tobacco bonds "gimmicks" but states that 
"they do represent a one time revenue as opposed to the receipt of a revenue flow on an 
annual basis." Fitch Ratings questions the wisdom of using a long-term liability (tobacco 
bond) to solve a short-term financial problem (budget gap) noting" that it was not 
necessarily wise to set up a 25-30 year liability if the proceeds were to be used to fund a 
one to two year deficit.,,24 
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Nonetheless, the tobacco settlement monies are viewed as an asset to the states. 
Standard and Poor's recognized this and stated that a state can make use ofthese monies 
to increase its budgetary flexibility, which S&P views positively while pointing out that 
tobacco bonds and the cash from the tobacco settlement are "one of a number of sources 
of flexibility (along with various reserves, pension funding assumptions, shifts of capital 
purchases from pay-as-you-go to bond funding) which it is legitimate to use when 'it 
rains' . They are a legitimate option to bridge time and funding gaps to get back to 
balanced operations.,,25 
The primary concern regarding the "securitization" of all or some ofthe projected 
tobacco funds is the long-term viability ofthe settlement payments. Those tobacco 
settlement funds are dependent upon the future fiscal health of the tobacco companies. 
Should the tobacco companies be unable to pay the terms ofthe (1998) settlement, any 
tobacco bond repayment schedule is jeopardized because the collateral (tobacco company 
payments) is interrupted and/or unavailable. A state would be indirectly but certainly 
liable for repayment. This risk factor would be worked into a tobacco bonds price when 
and if it was offered by a state. Therefore, the up front cash from a tobacco bond would 
be less than the sum of the monies promised to a state in the settlement terms. The 
Tobacco Bond price and interest would not be as favorable as Massachusetts general 
obligation bond sales price and rate of return. The tax exempt status of the Tobacco 
Bond is open to interpretation, according to various testimony heard by, and materials 
reviewed by, the Credit Rating Working Group. 
4. SPECIFIC ISSUES 
I. TOBACCO BONDS 
The Origin of Tobacco Bonds 
Tobacco bonds were introduced shortly after the national tobacco settlement with 
the states. Several investment houses - Bear Steams, Merrill Lynch & Company, 
Goldman Sachs, PaineWebber, Inc. - are "pitching" these promised tobacco funds as new 
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securities. In the first full week of March, the Governor of Rhode Island proposed to the 
R.I. General Assembly that the state's tobacco monies be indebted to produce much 
needed cash. The proposal was met with skepticism.26 In particular, the Providence 
Journal reported that the R.I. Governor's proposal "did not completely jibe with the 
warnings that Wisconsin lawmakers received" when that state embraced "tobacco bonds" 
recently.27 
Tobacco Bonds 
The so-called "Tobacco Settlement" was reached in part to mitigate the states' 
future health care costs and obligations as they were incurred due to individuals' use of 
tobacco products and the consequent deterioration of their health.28 In addition to the 
states, the Tobacco Settlement included several U.S. cities and U.S. territories, county 
governments and the District ofColumbia.29 The money had become a tempting target 
for budget balancers short on cash; however, today's windfall is tomorrow's 
unwelcome obligation. 
As state budgets experience a revenue shortfall, the use of the tobacco settlement 
money both present and future, is a tempting means to achieve a balanced budget. To 
obtain more cash that is annually available, some states (Wisconsin, Louisiana, for 
example), a California city (San Diego), and other political sub-divisions that were part 
of the Settlement created debt securities (bonds) out of the cash stream promised to them 
over time by the Tobacco companies that participated in the dea1.3o Several of the 
presenters specifically cautioned against so-called Tobacco Bonds as budget balancing 
devices because these bonds are one-time cash infusions. [see earlier section of this 
report sub-titled: "Credit Ratings: Beware of Gimmicks"] Nonetheless, these "tobacco 
bonds" were also recognized as state assets that could be used for "some purposes." The 
question is, what is the most prudent long-tenn use ofthe Tobacco Settlement money. A 
few states (Tennessee, Wisconsin, Iowa, and now Rhode Island's Governor is suggesting 
it to the state Assembly) have issued Tobacco bonds to either plug a shortfall or to get the 
bulk of their money now. Both actions are viewed with suspicion. The recent S&P State 
of the States report notes that two of the states with Tobacco bonds, (Tennessee and 
Wisconsin) are on Credit Watch with Negative Implications. Tennessee, Standard and 
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Poor's noted in its State of the States report, has used one-time revenues for the past four 
fiscal years, along with spending cuts, to balance its budgets.3 ! Tennessee was the first 
state to issue bonds collateralized upon that state's anticipated Tobacco settlement.32 
'Tennessee ... has used one-time revenues for the past four fiscal 
years, along with spending cuts, to balance its budgets. ' 
In addition, the Tobacco bonds carry a certain risk, both credit rating analysts and 
state debt managers told the Select Committee on Credit Rating, because the revenues to 
pay the 1998 settlement were based on the tobacco companies continuing, profitably, in 
the business of making and selling tobacco products. However, there is a logical problem 
with this premise. The settlement itself suggested an active public health campaign to 
persuade people to stop smoking. The smoking habit is precisely where the tobacco 
companies get their money, and paradoxically if the "stop smoking" public health 
campaign is successful, the tobacco settlement money to the states is in jeopardy. That is 
bad news for both Tobacco Bond investors and for the states that issue Tobacco Bonds. 
lftobacco company revenues fall, so do the proceeds to the states. Tobacco 
company revenue shortfalls increase the investor's risk for a possible default on the 
Tobacco bonds. That too is bad news for the states issuing Tobacco Bonds because if the 
bonds' revenues become unstable or nonexistent, the issuing states may have to guarantee 
the remainder of the repayment. That guarantee would hurt a state's credit rating because 
it is hard to quantify the future obligation and the consequent risk to investors.33 
RECOMMENDATION: 
The Working Group recommends that the Legislature avoid the 
issuance of "Tobacco Bonds" as means to address the structural budget 
deficit. 
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II. COMMONWEALTH STABILIZATION FuND 
Re-Capitalize the Stabilization Fund 
All of the major credit agencies recognize the Commonwealth Stabilization Fund 
to be a major Massachusetts asset. While it is fortunate and forward-looking that the 
state has this asset, depletion of it against an unknown financial future is a concern. 
Indeed, one credit rating agency witness among the panel told the Credit Working Group 
that her agency had some concern about the outflow of cash from the Stabilization Fund. 
Imprudent use of the Stabilization Fund may cause it to be used in lieu of a more 
d· 34 necessary a Justment on expenses. 
The State of Minnesota is developing a plan to restore reserves in future fiscal 
years. This action is viewed positively from a credit standpoint, according to Standard 
and Poor's report. The report further notes that a Mississippi statute requires budgeted 
appropriations to be less than 98 percent of official revenue forecast with a percentage 
remainder of the appropriation deposited to that state's stabilization account. Similarly, 
"The State of Missouri makes one half of its stabilization fund available in a given year. 
In order to access the funds, a two-thirds vote of the Legislature is required. Thereafter, 
only one-third of the amount transferred or expended from the budget reserve fund for 
budget stabilization purposes during any fiscal year, together with interest that would 
otherwise have been earned on such amount, shall stand appropriated to the budget 
reserve fund during each of the next three fiscal years until such time as the fund has 
been replenished,,35 These actions by the above states are viewed as being fiscally 
prudent and credit positive. 
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RECOMMENDATION 
Therefore, the Working Group recommends the following: 
(1) Any ongoing use ofthe stabilization fund be subject to a two-
thirds vote of the Legislature and that the funds accessed be 
appropriated back to the stabilization fund over a four year 
period; 
(2) For years where the Commonwealth does not experience a 
surplus, the Legislature set appropriations at less than 98percent 
of the official revenue forecast and the remainder to be 
appropriated to the stabilization fund; 
(3) The Legislature establish a "Debt Avoidance Fund" that will be 
financed by revenues from capital gains, bonuses and stock 
options that exceed the historical average for those components 
of personal income as established by the Legislature and the 
Department of Revenue. 
III. PENSION FUNDING 
Avoid Retreat from Accelerated Pension Schedule 
Debt managers and credit analysts recommend that no reduction in the pension 
repayment schedule budget appropriation occur without a comprehensive plan that 
achieves overall fiscal balance and addresses pension stability over the short and long 
terms. 
Also a revised valuation and analysis of any proposal to alter the current pension-
funding schedule is an essential part of any plan to restore structural balance to the 
Massachusetts budget. 
Without an accurate, revised valuation and an analysis ofthe long-term effects of 
this appropriation deceleration, the move is risky and is not part of a realistic 
comprehensive fiscal plan to provide structural balance. Without being part of a 
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comprehensive fiscal recovery plan, extending the pension schedule is tantamount to 
deficit financing.36 
One option suggested to the Legislature for closing the deficit for FY02 and 
beyond is to extend the pension schedule established under G.L. c. 32, §22C. Under the 
provisions of that statute, the Commonwealth's un-funded pension liability will be 
reduced to zero by June 30, 2018.37 This schedule reflects an acceleration of the initial 
schedule that set 2028 as the date for full funding. The suggested option retreats from the 
position of accelerated repayment. 
Under the present funding scheme, Commonwealth appropriations are set 
pursuant to actuarial analysis predicated upon the 2018 full funding date. As such, the 
Legislature appropriates an amount sufficient to pay the current costs of retirement 
benefits and an amount above the actual cost of benefits that is intended to fund the 
Commonwealth's future pension liability. This appropriation and the investment 
earnings of the Pension Reserves Investment Trust (PRlT) Fund, combined, are 
calculated to fully fund the liability by June 30, 2018. 
The acceleration of the schedule from 2028 to 2018 was accomplished through 
increased legislative appropriations and above average returns on the PRlT Fund's 
investments. The Commonwealth was able to increase annual appropriations because of 
significant yearly surpluses in the general fund. Similarly, the PRlT Fund, as recently as 
2000, enjoyed a rate of investment fund return in excess of 16 percent. 
The factors that made this possible are not present today. For FY 98, 99 and 2000 
approximately $441 million was transferred from the State Employees' and State 
Teachers' accounts in the PRlT Fund to pay retirement benefits.38 In addition to the 
diminishing appropriation, in real dollars and as a percentage of the actual retirement 
benefits, the PRlT Fund has experienced losses for two consecutive years.39 In 2001, for 
example, the PRlT Fund lost 5.3 percent on its investments. The investment losses alone 
would require that the Legislature increase the yearly appropriation in order to maintain 
the 2018 target date. When diminished appropriations are added to fund losses, the 2018 
statutory mandate is not attainable. As such, the next valuation of the system performed 
by PERAC will show that in order to sustain the 2018 full funding schedule, the 
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Legislature will have to significantly increase appropriations to the Commonwealth's 
Pension Liability Fund in the years to come. 
Commensurate with the charge to the Working Group, any deceleration of the 
pension schedule back to 2028 must be analyzed from the perspective ofthe credit rating 
agencies. Moody's Investment Services, Standard & Poor' s and Fitch Ratings have all 
stated that a deceleration ofthe schedule to 2028 would be viewed as "credit neutral.,,40 
The agencies would not take a negative ratings outlook if the Legislature were to return 
the schedule to where it had been originally: 2028.41 The agencies stated that the 
acceleration to 2018 was made possible by fiscal and economic conditions that may never 
again occur.42 Therefore, a return to a more "realistic" fiscal environment would justify 
the return to the original schedule.43 
All credit rating statements that were made by the agencies, 
including the pension-funding schedule, were tempered by a belief that 
any budgetary decisions must be made as part of a comprehensive 
plan. 44 
All credit rating statements that were made by the agencies, induding the 
pension-funding schedule, were tempered by a belief that any budgetary decisions must 
be made as part of a comprehensive plan.45 Any recourse to one-time revenue sources 
must be followed with a plan that seeks to achieve structural balance in the budget as the 
final goal. Therefore, while the deceleration of the schedule may not, in and of itself, be 
objectionable from a credit rating perspective, the deceleration must be combined with a 
comprehensive plan that achieves overall fiscal balance and addresses pension stability 
over the short and long terms. 
When viewed through the prism of a comprehensive plan, the proposed reduction 
in pension fund appropriation for the remainder of FY02 is flawed. The $912 million 
appropriation that was approved for FY02 has already been paid out to retirees this 
year.46 In fact, as has been the case since FY98, the Pension Reserves Investment 
Management (PRIM) Board will have to liquidate approximately $500 million in 
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assets from the PRIT Fund in order to meet benefit payments for FY02.47 A further 
reduction in the appropriation in the amount of $130 million will have to be met with a 
further liquidation of assets of the State Employees' and State Teachers' accounts within 
the PRlT Fund. Without an accurate, revised valuation and an analysis of the long-term 
effects of this appropriation deceleration, the move is risky and is not part of a 
comprehensive fiscal plan to provide structural balance. 
As stated earlier, without being part of a comprehensive fiscal recovery plan, 
extending the pension schedule is tantamount to deficit financing. 48 By reducing 
appropriations and delaying full funding for ten years, the Legislature in effect will 
be borrowing from the assets of the PRIT Fund to fund yearly operating expenses in 
the form of current retirement benefits. The continued borrowing will exacerbate the 
present gap between the assets of the PRlT Fund and the amount necessary to achieve 
full funding. Without significant appropriations or above average returns on investments, 
the 2028 schedule may be unattainable. 
Similarly, the recent early retirement bill and pending layoffs, if necessary, will 
"significantly increase the liabilities to the fund.'.49 These two actions will increase the 
yearly liability to the pension funds. As noted, the current appropriation is 
insufficient to meet the present obligations of the system. This shortfall causes PRIM 
to liquidate PRlT held funds. With an additional 5000 employees receiving retirement 
benefits and an unspecified number being eligible for c. 32, § 1 0 benefits should the 
Commonwealth layoff employees, the current yearly cost will be greatly increased. 
A confluence of events threatens to undermine the progress made over the past 
ten years to fully fund the pension system by 2018 or 2028. A persistent reduction in the 
yearly governmental appropriation, increasing yearly liabilities, a negative short-term 
investment performance, and increasing liquidation ofPRlT assets all serve to strain the 
Commonwealth's ability to fully fund the system by 2028. 
Therefore, no reduction in the budget appropriation should occur without a 
comprehensive plan that achieves overall fiscal balance and addresses pension stability 
over the short and long terms. 
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RECOMMENDA nON: 
Therefore, the Committee recommends the following: 
(1) No reduction in the budget appropriation should 
occur without a comprehensive plan that achieves 
overall fiscal balance and addresses pension stability 
over the short and long terms. 
(2) A revised valuation and analysis of any proposal to 
alter the current pension-funding schedule must be 
an essential part of any plan to restore structural 
balance to the Massachusetts budget. 
IV. DEFICIT FINANCING 
"Fiscal Recovery Bonds" 
Deficit financing was a financial vehicle that Massachusetts utilized in its last 
major recession and consequent collapse of state revenues; the late 1980s and early 
1990s, the end of the so-called "Massachusetts Miracle." Deficit financing is viewed as a 
desperate debt tactic. One rating agent described deficit financing as "sending a 
(well-understood) message to investors: 'This is a problem that can't be fixed.",5o 
All rating agencies warned against that investor message. Similarly, the state Treasurer's 
office said that perfect timing regarding the spending "down" of the Stabilization Fund 
was a nonsensical notion because no one could predict the precise end of the recession or 
of the return of, or "uptick" in, state revenues. If, however, the stabilization fund were 
exhausted, and further spending was necessary, and the revenue to support that spending 
was non-existent, (so-called deficit financing) certain debt vehicles are more appropriate 
than others. Straight General Obligation debt is the cheapest way to proceed, where 
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tobacco bonds would be priced higher than the GO bond because of the source of the 
repayment (tobacco companies) to investors. Pension Obligation Bonds were not good 
deficit financing vehicles, the Office ofthe State Treasurer stated. 
Deficit financing creates unforeseen problems. For example, the state 
Comptroller noted that cash flow considerations in the early 1990s caused the state to 
restructure its repayment of the debt incurred by the deficit financing measures of the late 
1980s and early 1990s. That restructured payment cost more in interest but was 
necessary to repair and restore the state's cash flow. That repayment authorized by 
Chapter 5 of the Acts of 1992 is still being paid off, according to the State Comptroller.51 
The alternative to deficit spending is revenue raising and expense reduction. 
On the latter point, at least one rating agency analyst that spoke to the tri-committee 
working group noted that "some people do not consider Massachusetts a high tax state" 
explaining that the "high tax" moniker was often the result of inappropriate comparison 
between states. Utah and Florida as comparisons, for example, make Massachusetts 
appear "high tax" but the comparisons are badly chosen. At the same time, items on the 
expense side also must be weighed. School Building Assistance for new school 
construction in Massachusetts cities and towns is extremely generous with one rating 
agency stating that "In New Jersey if they (municipalities) can get 18 percent (state) 
building assistance they are dancing in the streets. ,,52 In regard to analyzing expenses, 
one credit rating analyst commented that the decentralized human service agencies are 
difficult to assess in terms of costs and management. That analyst noted that the old 
institutional model was easy to assess: "it was a geographically based cost center, here is 
what it is, this is its (client) population, here is what you get.,,53 
Recommendation: 
Therefore, the Working Group recommends the following: 
(1) That the Legislature avoid the issuance of any 
fiscal recovery bonds or deficit financing. 
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V. CENTRAL ARTERY/ TUNNEL (CAlT) 
Central Artery/Tunnel Project (CAIT) 
At the first public hearing of the House Select Committee, Moody's Investors 
Service stated that although the CAiT Project is an ongoing concern, this concern is 
somewhat mitigated by the fact that all of the Project's major construction contracts have 
been awarded. The Commonwealth has signaled to the investment community that it is 
committed to completing the project on schedule with the resources at hand, according to 
Moody's.54 Standard & Poor's views the CAiT as a long-term concern, placing 
considerable pressure on state resources.55 S&P pointed out that it is unclear how any 
potential further cost overruns will be funded, and who would ultimately be responsible. 
Although S&P thinks that the project will be completed, it is mindful that the other 350 
communities in the Commonwealth may be shortchanged. 56 
At the Credit Rating Working Group's (CRWG) public hearing on March 5, 2002, 
a CRWG co-chairman asked each of the representatives from the credit rating agencies as 
well as Massachusetts Turnpike Authority officials if they would affirm that the present 
$14.475 billion CAiT project cost would hold. 57 No one ventured to affirm the amount. 
On the Saturday following the Credit Rating Working Group's public hearing, both the 
Boston Globe and the Boston Herald reported an additional price increase of$162 
million. 58 The Turnpike Authority attributed this cost change to an "accounting shift" 
required by the US Department of Transportation Office of the Inspector General 
(DOTIG) in order for the Project to receive federal approval of its October 2001 [mance 
plan and to access remaining federal funding. As a condition of approval, the DOTIG 
required that total project costs reflect $150 million in insurance premiums that the 
Project intended to pay with interest earned on reserves on its Owner Controlled 
Insurance Program (OCIP). The DOTIG also stipulated that the project account for the 
estimated $12 million cost ofleasing back its headquarters at 185 Kneeland Street. Since 
the Project plans to pay for this lease cost with contingency funds, the net increase of 
these adjustments brings total Project costs to $14.625 billion.59 
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Massachusetts Port Authority (MassPort) 
MassPort's bond ratings do not directly affect the Commonwealth's ratings.6o 
According to MassPort's testimony at the Credit Rating Working Group public hearing 
on March 20, 2002, MassPort's credit rating has historically been among the top of Port 
Authorities throughout the country, and still is, according to testimony. According to a 
UBS Paine Webber report on the municipal bond market and the outlook of airport 
operations, Logan Airport remains among the strongest airports in the nation from a 
credit perspective with "a large and diverse portfolio of air carriers" and "exceptional 
airport control facilities.,,61 Following September 11 , MassPort implemented a fiscal 
recovery plan that significantly cut its operating and capital budgets. Staff levels were 
trimmed by 15 percent and many new capital projects have been postponed. MassPort 
also raised airport parking rates and tolls at the Tobin Bridge to bolster revenues. The 
report concludes that these austerity measures should make MassPort better positioned 
for the future as airline activity slowly rebuilds. MassPort officials anticipate that this 
process may take up to three years. 
In February, Moody' s affirmed the AAA bond rating on general revenue bonds 
with a negative outlook, and affirmed the A2 rating on passenger facility bonds with a 
negative outlook. Standard & Poor' s dropped MassPort's credit rating on March 151 from 
AA- to A+, the smallest possible downgrade.62 According to MassPort, S&P said they 
could not currently justify an AA rating for any airport given the industry climate.63 
Fitch has a "rating watch negative" on MassPort bonds.64 
MassPort was scheduled in 1997 to contribute a total of $300 million toward the 
(CAlT) project, and was directed to contribute an additional $65 million in 2000. That 
$65 million was paid. According to the Office of the State Treasurer, MassPort has paid 
$95 million of its obligation, plus the aforementioned $65 million for a total of$160 
million paid. An additional $105 million is due in December 2002, as well as $50 million 
in each of the following two Decembers. 
The CAiT Project was given special permission to spend this contribution prior to 
MassPort ' s actually paying it, in order to maintain adequate cash flows during the 
project's peak construction years. The Commonwealth has served as the cash 
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intermediary, paying the CAIT in advance and over time receiving reimbursement from 
MassPort. The Commonwealth has bonding authorization if necessary to pay for this 
cash gap. 
At the Credit Rating Working Group public hearing on 20 March 2002, 
MassPort's Director of Administration and Finance confirmed that the agency has in fact 
postponed its December 2002 payment of $1 05 million. MassPort worked out an 
agreement with the Executive Office for Administration and Finance and the State 
Treasurer to make this payment in the summer of2003. MassPort hopes to be in better 
financial standing by that time, and thus be able to receive a more favorable rating for the 
bonds that it will issue to make these Project contributions. MassPort officials 
emphasized, however, that they remain committed to meeting their CAIT project 
responsibilities. 
The Commonwealth has agreed to adjust its cash flow projections to allow for this 
delay. By agreeing to do this, however, the Commonwealth will be forced, itself, to 
access the bond market on a short-term basis.65 The short-term borrowing will result in 
approximately $1 million in financing costs to the Commonwealth.66 
RECOMMENDATION: 
Therefore, the Working Group recommends the following: 
(1) MassPort should be required to bear the additional financing 
cost to the Commonwealth as a result of the delay of its 
December 2002 payment. 
(2) MassPort shall advise and inform the Legislature in a timely 
fashion of any and all issues involving the health of the 
authority. 
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Massachusetts Turnpike Authority (MassPike) 
Fitch Ratings placed the Massachusetts Turnpike Authority (MT A) on a "rating 
watch negative" because of the October 30,2001 MTA board vote to delay toll increases 
on the Metropolitan Highway System and at the harbor crossings, which cost the MTA 
$30 million in foregone revenue. Fitch remains concerned that toll rates must go up in 
order to meet its CNT project debt payments, and the MTA' s ongoing management 
issues have further eroded this position. In November 2001, MTA officials proposed 
alternative revenue scenarios intended to mitigate the toll delay. However, the Fitch 
analyst stated at the March 5th CRWG hearing that she was never presented with the 
MTA's alternative plan.67 
Moody' s stated that their analysts were presented with the alternative plan; 
nonetheless, they felt that the alternative plan being offered by the Pike had weak 
provisions, offering one-time measures to bridge the revenue gap.68 Moody's therefore 
placed the Turnpike on a negative credit watch. Moody's also said that the Turnpike's 
ratings or concerns will not affect the Commonwealth' s ratings. 
The Massachusetts Turnpike Authority and the Massachusetts Port Authority 
issue their own bonds which are rated separately from the Commonwealth's credit rating; 
however, there is an understanding from the credit rating agencies' viewpoint that should 
any of the Commonwealth's authorities find themselves unable to make payments, the 
Commonwealth would likely have to step in and assume the obligations created by the 
respective entities.69 
Massachusetts Turnpike Authority debt totals $2 billion for the Metropolitan 
Highway System and $260 million for the Western Turnpike. The Authority has an 
additional $380 million in payments for the Central Artery/Tunnel Project. 
The ongoing legal dispute concerning the MassPike's board membership has a 
direct negative effect upon the bond rating of the authority. In assessing the rating of an 
entity, all of the rating agencies stated that the "management" of the entity was a 
component in setting the credit rating. Standard & Poor' s specifically establishes that the 
"autonomy" of a rate setting entity is important because autonomy insulates the utility 
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"from exposure to political interference that might deter a timely and adequate 
adjustment" of rates. 70 
The question of what extent the Board ofthe MassPike is autonomous in setting 
rates is currently pending before the Supreme Judicial Court.71 While the SJC 
deliberates, management uncertainties result in increased costs,n and an inability to make 
budgetary73 or polic/4 decisions affecting the Western Turnpike or the Metropolitan 
Highway System. 
The SJC will ultimately resolve the MassPike case according to the specific terms 
of the present legislation,75 but, in the interim, the continuing uncertainty has created 
credit concerns. Regardless ofthe SJC's final decision in the above matter, the 
Legislature should review and decide what level of autonomy should be imposed upon 
MassPike and other agencies76 and authorities ofthe Commonwealth. The certainty 
created by comprehensive legislation on the question of autonomy will be viewed in a 
positive fashion by the rating agencies. 
RECOMMENDATION: 
Therefore, the Working Group recommends the following: 
(1) The Legislature should review and determine what 
level of autonomy should be imposed upon the 
Massachusetts Turnpike Authority and other 
agencies and authorities of the Commonwealth. 
VI. SCHOOL BUILDING ASSISTANCE BUREAU (SBAB) 
"Larger than the State IS General Obligation Debt" 
The School Building Assistance Bureau's reimbursement program is considered 
one of the largest potential "budget busters" by both credit raters and debt managers. 
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One credit rater told the select committee that municipalities in New Jersey are "dancing 
in the streets" if they receive as much as 18 percent for school building assistance. In 
Massachusetts, by comparison, reimbursement ranges from 50 percent to 90 percent for 
hard construction costs, in addition to some debt service. Even the more affluent 
municipalities are eligible for as much as 50 percent school building contract assistance. 
According to the House Budget Study Group, "SBAB experienced 170% growth 
since 1992.,,77 In FY 1992, SBAB received $134 million, while in FY 2002 the funds 
were increased to $361 million.78 A recent report by the Executive Office of 
Administration and Finance projected that by FY2004, the Commonwealth would be 
appropriating $450 million annually - almost $200 million more than FY2000 levels. As 
of today, the Commonwealth's "out-year" obligation for SBA projects stands at nearly $6 
billion and is growing. There are 236 capital projects and 46 repairs currently on the 
waiting list. The Commonwealth's current SBAB commitment combined with the needs 
on the waiting list amounts to approximately $10.6 billion in out-year commitments.79 
By FY2005, the Commonwealth will have a greater outstanding obligation for SBA 
than for its total (2002) General Obligation debt, which supports the statewide 
capital-spending program.80 
The number of SBAB grants awarded each fiscal year is established in the 
General Appropriations Bill. The municipalities issue the bonds, then the state 
reimburses a portion of the costs through grants funded out of the state's operating 
budget, as noted above. The Commonwealth usually begins paying on those projects the 
following year, and continues to pay a portion toward a municipality's debt for the next 
20 years.8! While grants funded through the operating budget are legally subject to 
appropriation on an annual basis, the state has a moral obligation to assist municipalities 
that have already bonded their school capital costs, and bondholders expect the state to 
fulfill the original commitment. 82 
While the Commonwealth has an obligation to fund projects already on the list, a 
number of tighter requirements are being implemented based on the SBA reform law 
passed in 2000. Reforms include prioritizing projects on the list based on need. 
Moreover, the "2000 SBA reform law put a renewed emphasis on on-going maintenance 
and repair work, to minimize the need to replace or totally renovate existing buildings. ,,83 
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As an example ofthe need for program changes, a Department of Education 
representative testified that a project that in the recent past would have been reimbursed 
in under four years can now easily wait up to 10 years for reimbursement.84 As a 
consequence, 
roads. 
applicants who intend to begin construction prior to receiving the grant 
award must be prepared to issue the permanent financing ... Applicants 
must submit, prior to start of construction, a vote of the local appropriating 
authority (as defined in M.G.L. c.59 s.21C) acknowledging that placement 
on the waiting list does not guarantee a grant award within any particular 
time ... 85 
Given the current situation it is evident that the program is at a cross-
RECOMMENDA TION: 
Therefore, the Working Group recommends the following: 
(1) The creation of a select task force on the School 
Building Assistance program. The task force 
shall review the report and recommendations of 
A&F's report on "Reconstructing the School 
Building Assistance Program." 
(2) The task force shall issue findings on the 
feasibility of a capital pooling for school building 
projects. 
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VIT. REVENUE FORECASTING 
Greater "Sophistication " 
The ability of the Legislature to forecast revenues in a greater, more sophisticated 
and economic sector-based manner will bring greater financial and management stability 
in future and cyclical economic retractions. Sophisticated revenue forecasting is 
considered credit positive by the rating agencies. This enhanced forecasting will be a 
significant change similar to the Legislature's emphasis on a healthy stabilization fund as 
a "programmatic change that ... contributed to the significant improvement in its 
financial position since the fiscal crisis of the early 1990's.,,86 
The rating agencies stated that the present deficits are related, in part, to the 
establishment of expenditure levels based upon "unrealistic revenue" expectations.87 
Massachusetts' tax revenues are highly dependent upon revenue derived from personal 
income taxes.88 "Because these revenues are based more heavily upon volatile sources 
such as stock options and capital gains, growth in tax revenues has also been far more 
subject to wild swings than it would otherwise be. A market downturn that affects 
relatively few wage earners could tum gains into losses for investors, thus sharply 
contracting a hitherto rich source of revenue almost overnight. ,,89 
Between FY 2001 and FY 2002, it is estimated that revenues attributable to stock-
related tax receipts fell from $1.6 billion to $682 million, or a drop of$1 billion.9o 
Because the only "broad-based, timely, high-quality state level economic indicator" 
available is the data on non-farm employment issued by the United States Department of 
Labor' s Bureau of Labor Statistics," Massachusetts, like other states, is unable to 
effectively predict the impact on state revenues of down turns in the stock market91 or in 
particularly important sectors of the Massachusetts economy. 92 
In addition, the consensus tax revenue estimates, as presented by the 
Massachusetts Department of Revenue, are based upon estimates provided by two 
vendors' , Economy.com and DRIlWEF A, economic forecasts .93 These forecasts are 
based upon national economic trends with little Massachusetts ' based analysis. To the 
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extent that the Massachusetts' economic activity is highly reliant on particular sectors of 
the economy, it is unclear how much DOR bases its revenue estimates on those 
Massachusetts sector-based considerations. Standard & Poor's stated that Massachusetts 
revenue forecasting was "unsophisticated" because DOR was unable to segment, on a 
present basis, the components of personal income tax receipts that were related to 
employee bonuses and options on stocks94 and because it lacked a more sector-based 
analysis of the Massachusetts economy. 
In response to this critique and in order to place the Commonwealth in a more 
secure position for the next cyclical economic downturn, the Credit Rating Working 
Group recommends that the following recommendations be adopted. 
RECOMMENDATION: 
The Working Group recommends the following: 
(1) That the Legislature create a Legislative Fiscal Bureau similar to 
legislative budget offices in other states such as Wisconsin's Fiscal 
Bureau or on the national level, the Congressional Budget Office. The 
Bureau will be a non-partisan entity that will assist the House and 
Senate Committees on Ways & Means with certain functions which 
shall include (1) estimating state revenues; (2) analyzing and 
evaluating state programs; (3) monitoring state agencies' budgets and 
programs; and, (4) evaluating legislative proposals for fiscal effect. 
(2) The House & Senate Committees on Ways & Means, the Executive 
Office of Administration and Finance, and the Department of Revenue 
jointly conduct a study that will recommend methods or systems that 
will allow the Department of Revenue and the Legislative Fiscal 
Bureau to segment and project components of the personal income 
stream among capital gains, bonuses and stock options. In addition, the 
above study will also recommend methods or systems that will allow 
tax revenue estimates to be less reliant on national economic trends and 
be focused on state economic-sector analysis. 
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5. CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, the Credit Rating Working Group respectfully reports its findings 
and recommendations to the House membership for its review, consideration, discussion 
and deliberation. 
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Public Hearing Agenda 
Credit Rating Working Group 
House Committee on Post Audit and Oversight 
House Committee on Transportation 
House Committee on Long-Term Debt 
Gardner Auditorium, Tuesday, 5 March 2002 
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Credit Rating Working Group Co-Chairpersons 
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11: 15 a.m. James Rooney - Boston Convention Center 
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INDEPENDENT AGENCIES AND AUTHORITIES: 
"Powers of Appointment, Terms of Appointment, and Removal Provisions" 
Chapter 161A 
Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority 
Section 7 Board of Directors 
"The authority shall be managed by a board of nine directors, one of whom shall 
be the secretary who shall serve as chairman of the board and shall not be compensated 
therefor and eight whom shall be appointed by the governor to two year terms beginning 
July 1 and who shall be eligible for reappointment." "Any director, except the chairman, 
may be removed for cause by the governor. In event of a vacancy, a successor shall be 
named in the same manner as the vacated director and such successor shall serve for the 
remainder of the unexpired term." 
Section 18 Insufficiency of funds; payments by commonwealth 
"To the extent that funds paid to the authority pursuant to section 35T of Chapter 
10 are insufficient in any year to meet the debt service or other payment obligations of 
the authority, in connection with debt or other financing obligations ofthe authority, 
including, without limitation, leases, reimbursement obligations or interest exchange 
agreements, issued or entered into prior to July 1, 2000 in respect of which the 
commonwealth has pledged its credit or is otherwise liable or as to which the authority 
has covenanted to maintain net cost of service or contract assistance support, the 
commonwealth shall remain liable for the payment of such obligations or the provision of 
net cost of service or contract assistance support as to such obligation to the same extent 
as before the enactment of this chapter; provided, that the amount of any such support 
provided by the commonwealth to the authority pursuant to this section shall be in the 
form of a no-interest loan repayable within five years from the dedicated revenue source 
and system revenues of the authority. Notwithstanding the provisions of this section, the 
commonwealth may, subject to appropriation and the provisions of article 62 of the 
Constitution of the Commonwealth, pledge its credit, guaranty, or support for the funding 
of transit commitment made in connection with the central artery project, so-called, 
capital improvements required under the Americans With Disabilities Act, or any other 
projects to conform to federal statutory mandates, or projects or services specifically 
authorized by the general court after July1, 2000, or any other projects or services 
authorized by the general court prior to said July 1 for which funding is appropriated by 
the general court subsequent to said July 1; provided that the authority shall not be 
obligated to make expenditures for any such commitments or projects so authorized for 
which the funds necessary to complete and operate such commitments or projects, 
including the guarantee of contract assistance, have not been made available to the 
authority. The authority shall undertake such projects and services so authorized and 
funded and shall incorporate them into the capital investment program established 
pursuant to paragraph (g) of section 5 and shall not make them subject to the priority 
ranking established by said paragraph (g) for other projects ofthe authority." 
"If at any time any principal or interest is due or about to come due on any bond 
or note issued or assumed by the authority prior to July 1, 2000, other than any principal 
or interest on any bond anticipation note guaranteed by the commonwealth, or any 
payment is due or about to come due under any other financing obligation undertaken or 
assumed by the authority prior to July 1, 2000, including without limitation a lease, a 
reimbursement agreement, or an interest exchange agreement, and funds to pay the same 
are not available, the directors shall certify to the state treasurer the amount required to 
meet such obligations, and the commonwealth shall thereupon pay over to the authority 
the amount so certified. If the commonwealth shall not make such payment within a 
reasonable time or shall not pay when required under any applicable contact assistance in 
effect prior to July 1, 2000. The authority or any holder of an unpaid bond or note issued 
or assumed by the authority as aforesaid, or any obligee in respect of any other such 
financing obligation, acting in the name and on behalf of the authority as aforesaid, shall 
have the right to require the commonwealth to pay the authority the amount remaining 
unpaid, which right shall be enforceable as a claim against the commonwealth. The 
authority or any such holder or obligee may file a petition in the superior court for 
Suffolk county to enforce such claim or intervene in any such proceeding already 
commenced, and the provisions of chapter 258 shall apply to such petition insofar as it 
relates to the enforcement of a claim against the commonwealth. Any such holder or 
obligee who shall have filed such a petition may apply funds received by the authority on 
its claim against the commonwealth to the payment of the petitioner's unpaid obligation, 
and said court, if it finds such amount to be due to such holder or obligee, shall issue such 
an order." 
Chapter 15C 
Massachusetts College Student Loan Authority 
Section 2 Short title "Massachusetts Educational Financing Authority Act" 
Section 4 Massachusetts educational financing authority; members; terms; 
meetings; surety bond; conflict of interest. 
"The Authority shall consist of nine members who shall be residents of the 
commonwealth, not more than five of whom shall be members of the same political 
party. Seven members shall be appointed by the governor." "The other two members of 
the authority shall be the director of economic development ex officio and the 
commissioner of administration ex officio, or their designees. The members ofthe 
authority first appointed shall serve for terms expiring on July 15t in the years 1983, 1984, 
1985, 1986, 1987, and 1988, respectively, the term of each such member to be designated 
by the governor. The term of each ex officio member shall be concurrent with his tenure 
in that office. Upon the expiration of the term of any originally appointed member his 
successor shall be appointed for a term of six years. The governor shall fill any vacancy 
for the remainder of the unexpired term. Any member ofthe authority may be removed 
by the governor for misfeasance, malfeasance or willful neglect of duty or other cause 
after notice and a public hearing unless such notice and hearing shall be expressly waived 
in writing. Members of the authority may serve for successive terms of office." 
(d) "Five members ofthe authority shall constitute a quorum. The affirmative 
vote of a majority of all the members ofthe authority shall be necessary for any action 
taken by the authority. A vacancy in the membership of the authority shall not impair the 
right of a quorum to exercise all the rights and perform all the duties of the authority." 
Section 12 Payment of bonds or notes; liability of commonwealth 
"Revenue bonds or notes issued under the provisions of this chapter shall not be 
deemed to constitute a debt or liability of the commonwealth or of any political 
subdivision thereof or a pledge of the faith and credit of the commonwealth or of any 
political subdivision, but shall be payable solely from the funds herein provided therefore 
from revenues. All such revenue bonds or notes shall contain on the face thereof a 
statement to the effect neither the commonwealth nor the authority shall be obligated to 
pay the same or the interest thereon except from revenues of the education loan program 
or programs or the portion thereof for which they are issued and that neither the faith and 
credit nor the taxing power of the commonwealth or of any subdivision thereof is pledged 
to the payment of the principal of or the interest on such bonds or notes. The issuance of 
revenue bonds or notes under the provisions of this chapter shall not directly or indirectly 
or contingently obligate the commonwealth or any political subdivision thereof to levy or 
to pledge any form of taxation whatever therefor or to make any appropriation for their 
payment." 
Chapter 23G 
The Massachusetts Development Finance Agency 
Section 2 Creation; directors; officers and employees; termination; trade secrets 
(b) "The Agency shall be governed and its corporate powers exercised by a board 
of directors consisting of secretary of administration and finance and the director of 
economic development, or their respective designees, and nine members to be appointed 
by the governor. ... " "Each member appointed by the governor shall serve for a term of 
three years; provided, however, that of the initial appointed members four shall serve a 
term of two years and five for three years. Any person appointed to fill a vacancy in a 
like manner and shall serve for only the unexpired term of such member. Any member 
shall be eligible for reappointment. Any member may be removed from his appointment 
by the governor for cause." 
(c) "Six of the directors shall constitute a quorum and the affirmative vote of a 
majority of directors present at a duly called meeting where a quorum is present shall be 
necessary for any action to be taken by the board. Any action required or permitted to be 
taken at a meeting of the directors may be taken without a meeting if all of the directors 
consent in writing to such action and such written consents are filled with the records of 
the minutes of the meetings of the board. Such consents shall be treated for all purposes 
as a vote at a meeting." 
Chapter 81A 
The Massachusetts Turnpike Authority And Metropolitan Highway System 
Section 2 Members of authority; offices; quorums; salaries and benefits; indemnity. 
"The authority shall consist of three members to be appointed by the governor 
who shall be residents of the commonwealth, not more than two of whom shall be of the 
same political party." "The successor of each member shall be appointed for a term of 
eight years; provided, however; that any person appointed to fill a vacancy shall serve 
only for the unexpired term. A member ofthe authority shall be eligible for 
reappointment. Prior to entering upon the duties of his office, each member of the 
authority shall take an oath before the governor to administer the duties of his office 
faithfully and impartially and a record of such oath shall be filed in the office of the state 
secretary. " 
"Two members of the authority shall constitute a quorum and the affirmative vote 
of two members shall be necessary for any action taken by the authority. No vacancy in 
the membership of the authority shall impair the right of a quorum to exercise all rights 
and perform all the duties of the authority." 
Section 5 Issuance of notes or bonds; registration system 
(i) "Notes or bonds issued under the provisions of this chapter shall not constitute 
a debt ofthe commonwealth or any political subdivision thereof or a pledge of the faith 
and credit ofthe commonwealth or of any such political subdivision but such notes or 
bonds shall be payable solely from the funds herein provided therefor from turnpike 
revenues or metropolitan highway system revenues, as applicable. All such notes or 
bonds shall contain on their face a statement to the effect that neither the commonwealth 
nor the authority shall pay the same or the interest thereon except from revenues of the 
turnpike or the metropolitan highway system, as applicable, and that neither the faith and 
credit nor the taxing power ofthe commonwealth or of any political subdivision thereof 
is pledged to the principal of or interest on such notes or bonds." 
Chapter 708 of the Acts of 1966 
An Act Establishing the Massachusetts Housing Finance Agency 
Section 3 Massachusetts Housing Finance Agency 
"The MHF A shall consist of the commissioner of commerce and development, 
and the commissioner of corporations and taxation, ex officiis, and five persons to be 
appointed by the governor .... " "Each appointive member shall be appointed for a term of 
seven years, except that in making his initial appointments, the governor shall appoint 
three members to serve for terms of three, five, and six years respectively, as he may 
designate. Any person appointed to fill a vacancy shall serve only for the unexpired 
term. Any member shall be eligible for reappointment." 
"Four members of the MHF A shall constitute a quorum and the affirmative vote 
of four members shall be necessary for any action taken by the MHF A. No vacancy in 
the membership of the MHF A shall impair the right of a quorum to exercise all the rights 
and perform all the duties ofthe MHFA." 
Section 9 Credit Of The Commonwealth or any Subdivision Thereof Not Pledged 
"Bonds and notes issued under the provisions of this act shall not be deemed to 
constitute a debt of the commonwealth or of any political subdivision thereof or a pledge 
of the faith and credit of the commonwealth or of any political subdivision, but such 
bonds and notes shall be payable solely from the proceeds of the mortgage loans made 
under this act, reserve funds created therefore by the MHF A, and any mortgage insurance 
contracts pertaining thereto. All such bonds and notes shall contain on the face thereof a 
statement to the effect that neither the MHF A nor the commonwealth nor any political 
subdivision thereof shall be obligated to pay the same or the interest thereon except such 
proceeds, reserve fund or mortgage insurance contracts and that neither the faith and 
credit nor the taxing power of the commonwealth or any political subdivision thereof is 
pledged to the payment ofthe principal of or interest on such bonds." 
Appendix To Chapter 92 
Massachusetts Water Resources Authority Act 
Section 1-3 Massachusetts Water Resources Authority; creation; board of directors 
(a) "There is hereby created and placed in the executive office of environmental 
affairs a body politic and corporate and a public instrumentality to be known as the 
Massachusetts Water Resources Authority, which shall be an independent public 
authority not subject to the supervision or control of the executive office of 
environmental affairs or of any other executive office, department, commission, board, 
bureau, agency or political subdivision of the commonwealth except to the extent and in 
the manner provided in this act. The exercise by the Authority of the powers conferred 
by this act shall be deemed to be the performance of an essential public function." 
(b)" ... board of directors consisting of eleven members. One member of the board 
of directors shall be the secretary of the executive office of environmental affairs, serving 
ex officio, one member ofthe board of directors who is a resident of a Connecticut river 
basin community who represents water resources protection interests shall be appointed 
by the governor and shall serve coterminous with the governor, one member ofthe board 
of directors who is a resident of a Merrimack river basin community who represents 
water resources protection interests shall be appointed by the governor and shall serve 
coterminous with the governor, one member of the bored of directors shall be appointed 
by the governor upon the recommendation of the mayor of Quincy in accordance with the 
procedure set forth in paragraph (c) and shall serve a term of four years, one member of 
the board of directors shall be appointed by the governor upon the recommendation of the 
board of selectmen of the town of Winthrop by majority vote, in accordance with the 
procedure set forth in paragraph (c) shall serve a term of four years; provided however 
that one of the previous named five members shall be a minority person; three members 
of the board of directors shall be appointed by the mayor of the city of Boston and shall 
serve coterminous with the mayor, and three members of the board of directors shall be 
appointed by the advisory board as provided in section twenty-three of this act. "All 
persons appointed by the advisory board, including members initially appointed, shall be 
appointed to terms of three years with one term to expire in each year ... " "All persons 
appointed, including terms of members initially appointed by the advisory board, shall be 
appointed to terms of two years ... " 
(d) "Each member of the board of directors shall serve until his successor is 
appointed and qualified and each appointed member of the board of directors shall be 
eligible for reappointment. Each member of the board of directors appointed to fill a 
vacancy on the board shall be appointed for the unexpired term of the vacant position. 
Each member of the board of directors before entering upon his duties shall take an oath 
before the governor to administer the duties of office faithfully and impartially and a 
record of such oaths shall be filed in the office of the secretary of the commonwealth. 
Any member of the board of directors may be removed by the appointing authority for 
misfeasance, malfeasance, or willful neglect of duty upon the filing by the appointing 
authority with the secretary of the commonwealth of a statement of facts and 
circumstances which form the basis for such removal." "Six members of the board of 
directors shall constitute a quorum and the affirmative vote of six members shall be 
necessary and shall suffice for any action taken by the board of directors." "No vacancy 
in the membership of the board of directors shall impair the right of a quorum to exercise 
the powers of the board of directors." 
Section 1-16 Bonds not debt or pledge of commonwealth 
"Bonds issued under the provisions of this act, excepting any notes or bonds 
guaranteed or issued by the commonwealth under paragraphs (e) or (t), respectively, of 
section five, shall not be deemed to be a debt or pledge of the faith and credit of the 
commonwealth or of any of its political subdivisions, but shall be payable solely from the 
funds of the Authority from which they are made pursuant to this act. Bonds issued 
under the provisions of this act, excepting any notes or bonds guaranteed or issued by the 
commonwealth under paragraphs ( e) or (t) of section five, shall recite that neither the 
commonwealth nor any political subdivision thereof shall be obligated to pay the same 
and that neither the faith and credit nor the taxing power of the commonwealth or of any 
political subdivision thereof is pledged to the payment of the principal of or interest on 
such bonds. Further, every bond shall recite whether it is a general obligation ofthe 
Authority or a special obligation thereof payable solely from particular revenues or funds 
pledged to its payment. The aggregate principal amount of all bonds issued under the 
authority of this act shall not exceed the sum of $4,370,000,000 outstanding at anyone 
time; provided, however, that bonds for the payment of redemption of which, either at or 
prior to maturity, refunding bonds shall have been issued shall be excluded in the 
computation of outstanding bonds." 
Chapter 465 of the Acts of 1956 
An Act Providing For the Construction Of An Additional Vehicular Crossing 
Between Boston Proper And East Boston; Creating The Massachusetts Port 
Authority And Defining Its Powers And Duties; Providing For the Issuance Of 
Revenue Bonds Of The Authority, Payable Solely From Tolls And Other Revenues, 
For Financing Such Additional Crossing, Refinancing The Existing Tunnel And The 
Mystic River Bridge And Refinancing And Improving The State-Owned Airports 
And Port Of Boston Facilities; And Providing For The Transfer To Said Authority 
Of Said Existing Tunnel, Bridge, Airports And Port Facilities. 
Section 2 Massachusetts Port Authority 
"There is hereby created and placed in the department of public works a body 
politic and corporate to be known as the Massachusetts Port Authority, which shall not be 
subj ect to the supervision or regulation of the department of public works or of any 
department, commission, board, bureau or agency or the commonwealth except to the 
extent and in the manner provided in this act." 
"The Authority shall consist of seven members all of whom shall be appointed by 
the governor by and with the consent of the council, and shall be residents of the 
Commonwealth." "The members of the Authority first appointed shall continue in office 
for terms expiring on June 30th 1960, 1961, 1962, 1963, 1964, 1965, 1966, respectively, 
the term of each such member to be designated by the governor and to continue until his 
successor shall be duly appointed and qualified. The successor of each such member 
shall be appointed for a term of seven years and until his successor shall be duly 
appointed and qualified except that any person appointed to fill a vacancy shall serve 
only for the unexpired term. Any member of the Authority shall be eligible for 
reappointment. Each member of the Authority may be removed by the governor with the 
advice and consent of the council, for misfeasance, malfeasance or willful neglect of duty 
but only after reasonable notice and a public hearing unless the same are in writing 
expressly waived." 
"Four members of the Authority shall constitute a quorum and the affirmative 
vote of four members shall be necessary for any action taken by the Authority. No 
vacancy in the membership of the Authority shall impair the right of a quorum to exercise 
all the rights and perform all the duties of the Authority." 
